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Abstract 
Enterprise-scale organizations have large numbers of internal and external users, with different 
privilege requirements spanning across many resources. The dynamic nature of modern organizations 
demands that they efficiently and securely provision and deactivate data privileges to reflect rapidly 
changing user responsibilities. Previous approaches to consolidated user provisioning have focused 
on constructing and maintaining a formal model of user privileges, in order to predict what role/roles 
should be assigned to any given user, based on user classification and other user attributes. In real-
world deployments, formal models have not scaled well, because many users are unique and 
consequently there is no leverage to be gained by grouping them into roles. This paper proposes a 
scheme for dual control of user granular privilege and dynamic granular data access. The framework 
includes a correlated privilege control model and a label-based dynamic access level process. The 
method supports user activity control over cross-domain objects with variable data access granularity. 
It encompasses the advantages of existing role based and label based control, while reducing 
computation complexity and storage requirements. The proposed method has been formally verified 
and implemented in JAVA. 






Diverse organizations, governments and individuals share vast amounts of information. Since 
information sharing can potentially harm certain parties, it is typically governed by roles and policies 
that support subject privilege control and data granularity control (Lei Zhang et al. 2008). Both of 
these methods have been well studied and, typically, they are enforced by role-based access 
mechanisms and label based approaches, respectively.  
Within an organization, roles are generated for various job functions. Specific roles are assigned in 
accordance with the permissions to perform certain operations. The users acquire permissions based 
on their roles rather than generality, and as such the rights of individual user management becomes 
the assignment of appropriate roles to the user (Ferraiolo, D.F. and Kuhn, D.R., 1992, Sandhu, R. et al. 
1996). Also, granular data control, or fineness with which data fields are sub-divided addresses two 
main aspects- (i) How to achieve fine-grained granularity and data selection/sanitization ? and (ii) 
object-based privilege control. The latter will be discussed in this paper.  
With an increasing complexity of infrastructure along with a growing number and diversity of users 
who must access it, the apparent limitation of privilege control on which traditional role is based has 
emerged. Furthermore, providing data granularity adds difficulty to the deployment of existing 
approaches in circumstances where the majority of users are unique i.e. their role is assigned to a 
single user only.  
The main issue is to control two aspects simultaneously: (i) When accessing the whole object, which 
activities are available for each granular data? and (ii) For numerous unique users, how to realize 
dynamic granular data access level control. We will be examining three sub issues here- (i) unique 
subjects, (ii) collaboration and (iii) multi-domain application.  
In this paper, we propose a solution to integrate sophisticated access control into a request-based pair-
wised privilege control model, which has three modules – (i) parameterized 3D subject granular 
privilege control (ii) object-based dynamic granular data control and (iii) privilege refinement. The 
model will consider the advantages of the existing role-based and label-based control. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a general background dealing with the 
fundamentals of the cooperation between user privilege granularity controls and object dynamic 
granular data level control. It also reviews the previous work by comparing it to the contemporary 
solutions. This is followed by a detailed proposed method, containing 3D user privilege granularity 
control, object dynamic granular data level control and their collaboration. Conclusions are provided 
at the end of the paper. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
There have been many attempts considering unique users with diversity privileges (Qingfeng He and 
Annie I Anton 2003; Xueli Li et al. 2005; Ali E. Abdallah and Etienne J. Khayat 2005). By 
incorporating context tables, one solution can support finer-grained privileges and subject variable 
request (Qingfeng He and Annie I Anton 2003). With additional condition list, another existing 
approach offers complex roles with diverse privileges (Xueli Li et al. 2005), while in the third 
approach, the traditional concept of 'role' fades out is replaced by a new parameterized model, which 
not only supports unique users better but also reduces the storage consumption than traditional role-
based approaches (Ali E. Abdallah and Etienne J. Khayat 2005). Nevertheless, these solutions try to 
add different modules to extend additional privileges with which the users can achieve diversity 
accordingly. Whereas, decreasing efficiency is unpreventable as the unique users come and go 
continuously. In addition, in (Ali E. Abdallah and Etienne J. Khayat 2005), role models are difficult to 
be built before the users lodge their requests. In contrast to these solutions, the proposed method 
builds an enhanced privilege assignment model that can directly assign privilege to subjects by 
request, priority check and privilege refinement. The storage consumption decreases when storing 
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diverse roles on the subject server becomes unnecessary. Moreover, the delicate modules and 
components offer efficient privilege assignment. 
For collaboration control, connecting subject with object-based privilege control is considered in 
previous approaches (Acevedo M.T. et al. 1997; Qingfeng He and Annie I Anton 2003). However, the 
former solution overlooks the granular data control like the latter and it provides a non-independent 
object based privilege control as well as limits the dual control performance. In the proposed solution, 
same hierarchical models, for subject and object based privilege control, add efficiency to granular 
data control. In addition, an independent object controller offers high performance and supports 
special condition control specifically, say, the worldwide-scale enterprise. For multi-domain 
application, building a roaming table (Lorenzo D. Martino et al. 2008) that explores the method to a 
great extent without referring to the practical issues of role changing and data granularity will not only 
consume considerable storage resource but also lower the privilege assignment efficiency. In contrast, 
a dynamic hierarchy component that caters for data roaming without compromising a high 
management cost is adopted by the proposed method. 
3 PROPOSED METHOD 
In this section, the proposed pair-wise privilege control scheme is examined from three aspects: 
namely the Privacy label based Subject granular Privilege Control (PSPC) module; Privacy label 
based Object granular Data Control (PODC) module and the collaboration control model (See Figure 
1).  
 
Figure 1. Pair-wise Privilege Control Model 
Basic concepts and definitions are given below: 
Definition 1: A set of subject },,2,1|{ niSS i L== , where n is the number of subjects in a data 
sharing environment. A set of object },,2,1|{ niOO i L== , where n is the number of objects. Each 
object has a set of granular data  },,2,1|{ niOGDO ix L== , where n is the number of granular data. 
Definition 2: A set of subject activity },,2,1|{ niSASA i L== , where n is the number of subject 
activity. A set of Subject Activity level represented by },,2,1|)({ niSASL i L=Ω=  denotes the 
subject activity priority on the required object, where n is the number of subject activity level and 
operation Ω(SA) denotes the sub set of SA. Subject Grade denotes the subject’s overall privacy 
priority, which is represented by SG. A set of Subject Sub Grade },,2,1|)({ niSLSSG ix L=Ω=  
denotes the access priority for each granular data of an object, where x denotes a certain sub grade and 
n is the number of activity levels included in the sub grade.  
Definition 3: Object Grade (OG) denotes the minimum overall privacy priority of the requiring 
subject. A set of object sub grade },,2,1|{ niOSGOG i L== , where n is the number of  granular 
data and OSG denotes Object Sub Grade. A set of Negative Permission },,2,1|{ niNPNP i L== , 

























which indicates duty x composing of subject i requires access on object k with a set of activity j. 
Permission )},{( BooleanDP ix = , where Boolean indicates acceptance and rejection. 
3.1 PSPC Module 
The PSPC is a subject based privilege control module and has three components which are core PSPC, 
hierarchical PSPC and Subject Privacy Label Generator.  
3.1.1 Core PSPC 
The core defines five basic elements in PSPC module, which are subject (S), duty (D), 
operation/activity (A), object/resource (O), privacy label (SPL) and session SYN (SYN(s)). Operation 
is a set of subject activities. Subject operation is presented as subject activity. Privacy label is a 
control frame containing processing parameters and subject privilege candidates. Session SYN is a 
parameter indicating a valid time period for the refined privileges. In PSPC, no negative permissions 
are assigned to SPL, while it is to be assigned only to Object Privacy Label. PSPC is a request-based 
subject privilege strategy. After a subject duty request is sent to subject server, it will be first checked 
whether the subject is allowed to lodge the duty request. The duty request is derived from Hierarchical 
PSPC component and the privilege candidates that are included in SPL. 
3.1.2 Hierarchical PSPC 
Hierarchical PSPC defines the control of subject granular privileges. Rule 1: Subject Activity in the 
same Subject Activity Level is mutually exclusive, which means only one will be activated in the same 
session, while these activities can work on granular data in the same session if they are on different 
levels.  Rule 2: Subject Activity Level in one Subject Sub Grade must be different to other activity 
levels in the same subject grade. Rule 3: Different Subject Sub Grades are controlled independently. 
Definition 5: Subject Activity Level correlation process operation is Θ which is an arithmetic 
operation set of subject levels. If the process result of SL1 and SL2 is needed for the further use, the 
operation result will be ),(S 21AR LLΘ . 
 
Figure 2. PSPC Hierarchy Structure 
Figure 2 shows an example of PSPC hierarchy structure, from which we can derive  SG = {SG_val, 
(SSG1,SSG2)}, where SG_val denotes the value of SG; Ω(SL)3 = {SL1, SL6} and Ω(SL)6 = {SL1, SL2, 
SL4}; SL1 = {SA1, SA4} and SL2 = {SA5} etc. Basically, after a request has been lodged to a subject 
server, the subject is to be associated with an overall privacy priority, also called main subject access 
grade and represented by Subject Grade (SG). The SG usually consists of a set of SSG which are 
associated with granular data of the required object. Each SSG is composed of a set of SLs, which 
indicates the priority and correlation between different SA. SAs included in the SL are the behaviours 
indicating what can be executed over the object. 
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3.1.3 Subject Privacy Label Generator 
After the processing of component of Hierarchical PSPC, the construction of the parameterized SPL is 
generated as. SPL (subject) = [subject identity (hash), domain classification code, object identity 
(hash), flags, PSPC control code, session SYN] Where domain classification code (DCC) indicates 
the activated working area; flags indicates special structure of the frame. Normally, it should be zero 
and it is designed for future works; PSPC control code (SCC) contains the semantic PSPC Hierarchy 
Structure, which can be represented as follows:  
SCC = {SG_val}∪{SSGx_val | x∈[1, n]}∪{Ω(SL)y }∪{Ω(SA)z}; where n denotes the number of 
required granular data on an object; the number of y and z depends on subject request.  
3.2 PODC Module 
The Pair-wise Object granular Data Control (PODC) module is a label based control frame employed 
for dynamic granular data and multi-domain application. The core PODC defines three basic elements 
in PODC module, which are meta-data, dynamic hierarchy and object privacy label. In order to 
explain the paper further, we define the following terms: Granular data – is fine-grained meta bits. 
Dynamic hierarchy - changeable object access priority control, which is detailed in Dynamic 
Hierarchy. Privacy label - control codes derived from Hierarchy Assignment (HA) which denotes the 
computation of connecting relative access priority to applied privacy priority. Data mapping - 
operation of making connection between granular data and their access priority. 
3.2.1 Dynamic Hierarchy 
Component Dynamic Hierarchy has two main functions, which are Hierarchy Assignment (HA) and 
Condition Assignment (CA). When data is roaming to other domains, the original privacy priority 
control may not be able to adjust properly. Figure 3 shows the concept of HA applied mapping. 
 
Figure 3. Hierarchy Assignment (HA) 
In Figure 3, Access Priority is represented by OG including OSGs. When the object X (including 
granular data) are created, it is processed by the original object server in the domain A, where original 
access priority is a non-absolute classification value. If such a data is required for roaming, the 
original object server will first assign a basic sub grade (BSG) to one or more granular data bit(s). 
Then, all other data bits can be assigned proper grades referring to BSG at original object server. 
When the data is roaming to domain B, the object server in domain B will first map BSG to a basic 
applied grade (BAG) based on the data sharing environment and sharing requirement. Then, the 
system maps the rest original granular data sub grades to applied grades based on their correlation to 
the BSG. PODC aims to achieve object dynamic granular data access control.  
3.2.2 Object Privacy Label Generator 
After the object server receives the request, the data is prepared for sharing, with object privacy label 




OPL (object) = [object identity (hash), domain classification code, subject identity (hash), flags, 
PODC control code, session SYN]. The most fields are similar as SPL while PODC control code 
(OCC) contains the semantic PODC Dynamic Hierarchy Structure, which can be represented as 
follow.  
OCC = {OG_val}∪{OSGx_val | x∈[1, n]}∪{Ω(NP)y }∪{Ω(SP)z} 
Where n denotes the number of required granular data on an object; the number of y and z depends on 
the object owner/manager's requirement.  
3.3 Pair-wise Privilege Control Model 
The Pair-wise Privilege Control Model introduces a collaborating structure to assist in defining and 
carrying rules of multi-domain data sharing for large amount of unique subjects’ environments. It 
enforces the concept of dual control both subject granular privilege and object granular data. For 
sharing information in such an environment, each subject sends request with duties including targets 
and activities to subject server, then derives SPL with privilege candidates. After that, object server 
will generate an OPL with authorized granular data. Finally, the component of privilege refinement 
computes out allowed privileges and sends them to a valid session (See Figure 1).  
3.3.1 The Component of Privilege Refinement 
Basically, after both privacy labels have been produced, approval privileges will be calculated by the 
component of privilege refinement, which has two parts: a) validation check of both subject and 
object general info, and b) privilege refinement. The former is detailed as follows and the later is in 










Where symbol ⊕ indicates the data matching process and & denotes logic 'and'; RE denotes 
Refinement Algorithm. If one of the terms is false, the overall result is false and the RE function 
aborts. Otherwise, the results of RE function will output to a valid session. 
3.3.2 Refinement Algorithm (RE) 
The RE function computes proper permissions for the subject request. Figure 4 (LHS) describes the 
first step of permission computing, which outputs the overall permission of the access. If the subject’s 
grade is equal to or higher than object prohibited grade, authorization will be given and move to the 
next step, otherwise access is denied. SiPL.SiG denotes the Subject Grade of Subject i; OPL.OG 
denotes object overall grade. The algorithm for sub grade computing is given in Figure 4 (RHS). The 
process compares all the subject sub grades to all object granular data grades respectively, where → 
denotes move to the next. Also, we have notations of permission symbols and extended SL operations 




Figure 4. Grade Computing and Sub Grade Computing 
Notion 1: (Positive Permission Operation =Γ) y
SA
xi OSGSGS jΓ=  denotes subject i is allowed to 
have activity j on the object granular data y in its duty x. Notion 2: (Negative Permission Operation !Γ) 
y
SA
xi OSGSGS jΓ!  denotes the object’s granular data y has negative permission (not allowed to access) 
on subject i with activity j in duty x.  Notion 3: (Activity and Level Process Θ) 
   
Figure 5. Level Computing and Activity Execution 
yixi LSLS
→Θ  denotes for the subject i and a granular data of the object, level y must be processed 
after level x;  yixi LSLS
←Θ  denotes for the subject i and a granular data of the object, level y must be 
processed before level x.; yixi LSLS
↔Θ  denotes for the subject i and a granular data of the object, 
level y and level x are mutually exclusive, which means only one level will be processed.; 
yixi LSLS
bΘ  denotes for the subject i and a granular data of the object, level y and level x can be 
processed simultaneously. The process in Figure 5 (RHS) is activity execution, which describes each 
required activity included in each level that is executed based on the results of the three algorithms 
explained above. 
Based on the algorithms, collaborating control of subject granular privilege and object dynamic 
granular data has been achieved. The detailed processing algorithms are provided in an extended 
thesis. We have verified our proposed scheme by Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) (Goldsmith, 
M. 2005), a model verification tool based on Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) state 
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machines. The proposed scheme is implemented in JAVA and the detailed verification and 
implementation are described in a separate thesis. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed a mechanism for collaboration of subject granular privilege control and 
object dynamic granular access level control. It addresses both the appearance of subject privilege 
granularity control in plentiful unique subjects and its connection with a changeable granular data 
permission control. The model can be implemented in diverse circumstances in which the private and 
sensitive data sharing is practical. Numerous unique subjects in such system will not consume as 
much memory overhead as traditional role-based methods. Dynamic granular data privilege control is 
supported by the proposed mechanism.  
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